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Awareness of Meaning in Libel Law:
An Interdisciplinary Communication
& Law Critique
CLAY CALVERT*

INTRODUCTION

More than three decades after the United States Supreme Court
constitutionalized libel law with its seminal decision in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan' and adopted the actual malice standard,2 a growing movement
has begun among legal scholars, 3 libel defense attorneys, 4 and a number of

* A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of the Pacific; Ph.D. Candidate,

Stanford University; Instructor, Stanford University.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The United States Supreme Court in Sullivan "constitutionalized" libel law by holding for the first time that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment." Id. at 269.
2. Id. at 279-80 (stating that actual malice exists when a defamatory falsehood is
published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or
false). See also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692
(1989) (providing that while a mere failure to investigate the veracity of a statement will not
alone support a finding of actual malice, "the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a
different category"); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (holding that a
reckless disregard for the truth exists when a defendant entertains serious doubts as to the
truth of his or her publication); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (holding that
a reckless disregard for the truth requires a "high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity").
Actual malice is a legal term of art that must be distinguished from the common law
meaning of malice as ill will, spite, or hatred. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501
U.S. 496, 510-11 (1991). As the United States Supreme Court stated in Masson, "the term
can confuse as well as enlighten. In this respect, the phrase may be an unfortunate one." Id.
at 511.
3. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in
Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (1984).
4. See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning,
and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237

(1993).
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federal courts5 to again alter the constitutional landscape of libel 6 law. In
particular, these individuals and courts want to add further protection-protection beyond the actual malice standard and procedural requirements--to
the constitutional shield that now guards defendants in civil libel actions.'
They call for a new, constitutionally mandated fault element. This element
requires public official8 and public figure 9 plaintiffs to prove that defen-

5. See, e.g., Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990);
Saenz v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); Woods v. Evansville Press
Co., 791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350
(N.D. Cal. 1993).
6. Libel is generally the written, pictorial, or broadcast form of defamation. Robert

D. Sack, Common Law Libel and the Press: A Primer, in 2 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 35, 41
(PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G372, 1993). As distinguished from slander, "[l]ibel consists of the publication of defamatory
matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form
of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed
words." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 568A (providing that "[b]roadcasting of defamatory matter by means of radio
or television is libel, whether or not it is read from a manuscript"). But see CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 46 (West 1982) (stating that slander includes defamation by "radio or any mechanical or
other means").
7. The United States Supreme Court has adopted a number of constitutional
safeguards in addition to the actual malice standard. For instance, the Supreme Court has
ruled that trial court decisions in libel actions are subject to independent review on appeal.
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989). In addition, the Court has held
that plaintiffs must prove falsity in libel actions involving media defendants when the speech
is a matter of public concern. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
8. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (defining public officials, for
purposes of the actual malice standard, as those government employees who are so important
that the public is independently interested in their qualifications and performance, beyond the
general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt. b (1977) (describing who
constitutes a public official); James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 890,
895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (providing a list of four factors that courts in California consider
when determining whether a government employee is a public official for purposes of
applying the actual malice standard in defamation actions). The Court's definition of a
public official is someone employed by the government who:
(1) has, or appears to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs; (2) usually enjoys significantly greater access to the mass media and therefore a more realistic
opportunity to contradict false statements than the private individual; (3)
holds a position in government which has such apparent importance that the
public has an independent interest in the person's qualifications and
performance beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and
performance of all governmental employees; and (4) holds a position which
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dants who publish allegedly libelous statements were aware of the defamatory meaning' ° at the time of publication."
C. Thomas Dienes and Lee Levine, prominent media defense attorneys
and two of the leading proponents of the proposed element, argue that "only
the publisher who was aware of the defamatory meaning at the time of
publication should be subject to legal responsibility in public figure
cases.""2 This sentiment was voiced originally by Stanford University Law
School Professor Marc A. Franklin and UCLA Law School Professor Daniel
J. Bussel, who called for courts to focus on "whether the speaker is aware
''3
of the defamatory meaning at the time he disseminates the statement. 1
Citing the work of Franklin and Bussel, one federal district court judge held
in 1993 that "awareness of defamatory meaning is an element of constitutional law."' 4
This new standard contrasts dramatically with the traditional, common
law rule under which "[t]he defendant's subjective state of mind regarding
the meaning of his publication was simply not relevant."' 5 As Dienes and
Levine state, at common law "[c]ourts did not even ask whether the
publisher could reasonably have known of the defamatory meaning. Only
the readers' understanding matter[s]."' 6 In brief, the common law imposed
strict liability (or liability without fault) on defendants for unintended
meanings.
The rationale for changing the common law rule and imposing the
awareness of meaning fault standard is to protect defendants in so-called
"surprise" defamation cases." These cases involve the libel by impression
invites public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it entirely apart
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular controversy.

Id. at 895.

9. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (defining three classes
of public figures, including all-purpose public figures, involuntary public figures, and
voluntary limited-purpose public figures). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
580A cmt. c (1977) (describing the origin of the public figure classification and criteria for
determining if a person is a public figure for purposes of a defamation action).
10. A meaning is defamatory "if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
11. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
12. Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 244.
13. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 887.
14. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1361-62 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
15. Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 247.
16. Id. n.53.
17. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 832.
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(or libel by implication) 8 and extraneous facts scenarios,' 9 as well as the
more general problem of multiple meanings created when the language used
is ambiguous and a defendant could be held "liable for something he did not
mean to convey." 2 ° In brief, advocates of the standard ask the legal
community to ponder the question: Why should defendants be held strictly
liable for communicating a message when they never knew about nor
intended to imply the fact or meaning that the plaintiff argues the message
conveys?
Supporters of the standard argue that First Amendment 2' policy
concerns of enhancing speech protection and preventing self-censorship
militate in its favor. For instance, Franklin and Bussel assert that the
standard "logically stems from the United States Supreme Court's decision
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan."22 They note that in creating the actual
malice standard, the Sullivan Court "reasoned that, if strict liability [was]
imposed, critics of the government might refrain from comment out of fear
of liability for a completely innocuous error."23 The actual malice

18. See generally ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS 188 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that in cases of libel by implication or
libel by impression "[s]tatements literally true may be actionable if they imply false and
defamatory statements of fact. A literally true statement may imply facts that are not true.
In such cases, the defamatory implications as well as the stated facts may form the basis for
a cause of action").
19. Franklin and Bussel succinctly explain the extraneous fact scenario as follows:
This situation arises when an otherwise innocent statement becomes
defamatory because some or all of the audience know an extrinsic fact.
The classic example of this type of situation involves the publication of an
engagement notice about a man who is already married. Those who know
this unstated fact may think either that the man is lying to his alleged
fiancee, or that the woman they considered to be his wife is in fact not
legally married to him. At common law, the speaker was held liable for
such a statement, although he may not have known or had reason to have
known the extrinsic fact giving rise to the statement's defamatory meaning.
Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 834. See generally David M. Cohn, Comment, The
Problem of Indirect Defamation: Omission of Material Facts, Implication, and Innuendo,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 233 (1993) (providing a comprehensive review of the libel by
impression and extraneous fact scenarios).
20. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 833-34.
21. U.S. CONST., amend. I. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(providing that "freedom of speech and of the press--which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress--are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the States").
22. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 834.
23. Id. at 835.
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standard, Franklin and Bussel argue, simply represents one fault standard (on
the issue of truth/falsity) designed to protect the press--it was not intended
to be the only constitutional fault requirement.24 The awareness of
meaning standard represents an additional fault standard.
The proposed standard treats a defendant's state of mind about meaning
in much the same way that the actual malice rule treats a defendant's state
of mind about truth or falsity. Both standards focus on the subjective state
of mind of the defendant at the time of publication.2" While the actual
malice standard asks whether the defendant knew of or acted with reckless
disregard for the falsity of a statement or message, the awareness of meaning
standard asks whether the defendant knew of or acted with reckless
disregard for the meaning of that statement or message.2 6 The proposed
standard is a second subjective state of mind hurdle that public official and
public figure libel plaintiffs must clear on the road to recovery.27
While there is a bevy of communication research and theory on the
subject of meaning,28 the legal scholars and courts proposing the awareness
.of meaning standard--as well as communication researchers engaged in
interdisciplinary research in communication and law--have yet to consider
this literature or evaluate whether the proposed standard comports with the
realities of daily communication and the processes of message meaning.
More importantly, they have not considered whether the concept of meaning
may be sufficiently different from that of truth/falsity in libel law such that
it may make little sense to apply similar subjective state of mind standards
to both the libel elements 29 of defamatory meaning and truth/falsity.
24. See id. at 836.
25. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the actual malice standard is "a
subjective one" that focuses on a defendant's state of mind about truth and falsity at the time
of publication. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688
(1989). It is distinguished from an objective standard of negligence, as the Supreme Court
has stated that "[miere negligence does not suffice." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991).
26. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
27. This second hurdle represents a "significant supplement to the New York Times
requirement that the plaintiff show that the defendant recklessly disregarded or had
knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statement." Cass R. Sunstein, Hard Defamation
Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891, 893 (1984).
28. See generally STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); JOHN FISKE, INTRODUCTION TO
COMMUNICATION STUDIES (1990); GRAEME TURNER, BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES: AN
INTRODUCTION (1990).

29. The four basic elements of a cause of action for libel include: (1) "a false and
defamatory statement concerning another;" (2) the unprivileged publication of that statement
to at least one third party; (3) fault; and (4) "either actionability of the statement irrespective
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Bridging research from the disciplines of communication and the law
where relevant, this article critiques the merit of borrowing in wholesale
fashion a constitutional state of mind standard that applies to the issue of
truth/falsity--the actual malice standard--and applying it to the separate
element of defamatory meaning. The article argues that the awareness of
meaning standard conflicts with the realities of communication processes
inherent in the determination of message meaning, including the active role
that readers play in interpreting messages.3 ° It posits that the standard
of the defendant,
privileges the private thoughts and intentions in the head
3
ignoring the text and the reader's interaction with it. '
By ignoring the reader's interaction with the message, the standard also
ignores the relational nature of defamation and the foundation of the libel
tort. 32 In essence, it transforms libel from a three-party tort involving a
plaintiff, defendant, and message audience into a two-party tort with the
reader as the odd person out. Finally, the article argues that meaning and
truth/falsity are readily distinct concepts, determined by radically different
means that suggest that the element of meaning--unlike the element of
truth/falsity--in libel law is ill suited for a subjective state of mind
requirement like the proposed awareness of meaning standard.33
Part I of this article provides a brief introduction to the awareness of
defamatory meaning standard. 4 Part II critiques the awareness of meaning
standard from the perspective of both the law and communication theory and
research on message meaning.35 Part 11 argues that the awareness of
meaning standard: (1) conflicts with the realities of communication
processes inherent in determining message meaning; (2) conflicts with the
relational nature of the defamation torts of libel and slander, stripping the
audience of its active--and natural--role in defamation; and (3) represents a
subjective state of mind requirement that may be inappropriate as applied to
the element of meaning.
A brief statement about the benefits--and limitations--of interdisciplinary communication research on meaning and the law is in order. While
communication and related research clearly cannot dictate legal standards or
replace public policy judgments, and libel experts Randall P. Bezanson and

of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

90-108 and accompanying text.
107-08 and accompanying text.
109-23 and accompanying text.
124-45 and accompanying text.
39-89 and accompanying text.
90-145 and accompanying text.
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Kathryn Ingle emphasize that it cannot be ignored. a6 They stress that libel
law cannot "turn its back on the fundamental insights these fields provide.
This is especially so if libel law has employed approaches that respect the
nature of
the mass communication process, but has begun to veer away from
7
them.

3

Ultimately, this article suggests that the awareness of meaning standard
begins to veer away from the reality of the communication processes related
to meaning. It allows the private meaning in the head of a message source
(the defendant in a libel action) to trump the common law standard of "what
a reader could reasonably understand the publication to mean." 38 The
conclusion that the standard conflicts with the realities of meaning and the
dynamic processes of communication, as well as the relational nature of
defamation law, is not offered as a substitute or replacement for the free
speech policy considerations that scholars like Franklin and Bussel and
Dienes and Levine offer in support of the standard--it is far too presumptuous to believe that communication research can dictate legal reasoning and
public policy concerns. Rather, it is offered to supplement prior legal
analysis and, ultimately, to help ground a proposed law about meaning in
the realities of daily communication.
I. THE AWARENESS OF MEANING STANDARD

This part introduces the awareness of meaning standard. Initially, it
defines the standard as originally advocated more than a decade ago by
Stanford University Law School Professor Marc A. Franklin and law student
Daniel J. Bussel,39 and as more recently called for by C. Thomas Dienes
and Lee Levine. 4° These scholars and practitioners are the chief proponents of the standard, having written extensive and thorough law journal
arguments in its favor.
This part then explores how some lower courts already have adopted
it. In particular, Federal District Court Judge Eugene F. Lynch's recent
adoption of the awareness of meaning standard in both trials in the
celebrated libel case of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 41 is discussed. Other cases in which courts have adopted the standard are also
36. Randall P. Bezanson & Kathryn L. Ingle, Plato's Cave Revisited: The Epistemology of Perception in Contemporary Defamation Law, 90 DICK. L. REV. 585 (1986).
37. Id. at 591.
38. Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 247.
39. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3.
40. See Dienes & Levine, supra note 4.
41. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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described.4 2 The section then explains that while the United States
Supreme Court has never held that the awareness of meaning element is
compelled by the First Amendment, it has suggested, in dicta, that such an
element may be mandated by First Amendment free speech and free press
concerns.

43

A. THE PROPOSED STANDARD
As noted in the Introduction, at common law a defendant's state of
mind about the defamatory meaning of his -or her publication was irrelevant." The question of meaning focused only on "what a reader could
reasonably understand the publication to mean." 45 Defamation, as Franklin
46
and Bussel put it, has historically been "a recipient-centered concept."
A defendant could be held liable even though she did not mean to imply the
fact or convey the meaning that a reasonable reader might understand the
message to convey.
Today, there is a movement to require plaintiffs--in particular, public
official and public figure plaintiffs--to establish some level of fault against
defendants on the element of defamatory meaning. 4 A constitutional fault
standard--actual malice--already exists on the issue of truth and falsity.4 8
Now the effort has turned toward imposing a similar fault standard on the
element of defamatory meaning. The standard would require plaintiffs to
establish defendants' state of mind at the time of publication about the
alleged meaning conveyed by the message that causes reputational harm.
For instance, Franklin and Bussel assert that both public and private
plaintiffs should be required "to establish that the defendant was aware of
the statement's defamatory meaning. 41 Specifically, after determining that
a statement is reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning,
42. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990); Saenz v.

Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988); Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791

F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986).
43. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
44. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.

45. Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 247.
46. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 828.
47. An alternative proposal to the subjective state of mind requirement discussed in
this article calls for imposition of an objective standard of reasonableness on the question of

meaning. David Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422 (1975).

Under such an objective standard, defendants would have a duty "to use reasonable care to

avoid injury to reputation." Id. at 464.
48. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 845.
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Franklin and Bussel argue that "courts must require the plaintiff to establish
with convincing clarity that the defendant was aware of, or blinded himself
to, the allegedly defamatory meaning of the statement that he was mak0
ing."
Similarly, Dienes and Levine "argue that, at a constitutional minimum,
the defendant must in fact be subjectively aware at the time of publication
of the implied defamatory meaning pleaded by the public figure plaintiff."5 ' Both Franklin and Bussel and Dienes and Levine argue that the
"convincing clarity"52 standard of proof that applies to the issue of actual
malice should also apply to proof of a defendant's state of mind about
defamatory meaning.53
The Dienes and Levine proposal does, however, differ slightly from the
Franklin and Bussel test. First, Dienes and Levine would apply their
standard only to public official and public figure plaintiffs, while Franklin
and Bussel advocate its adoption in all cases, regardless of a plaintiff's
status. In addition, the Dienes and Levine proposal includes an escape hatch
for defendants who were aware that a potential defamatory meaning existed
but who also believed that an innocent, non-defamatory meaning for the
same factual statement exists and who did not know about the falsity of the
defamatory meaning at issue. A court applying the Dienes and Levine
standard must thus follow this rule:
[I]f a publication about a public official or public figure is
reasonably capable of both defamatory and nonactionable constructions, we would hold that there can be no defamation liability
if the publisher did not either deliberately set out to communicate
the defamatory meaning with actual malice or, aware of the
defamatory meaning, know it to be false at the time of publication.'
For Dienes and Levine, then defendants who are aware of a defamatory
meaning and who deliberately intend to convey that meaning may be held
liable. However, "if the publisher seeks to communicate a nonactionable
meaning, but knows that the alleged defamatory meaning may also be
communicated, the public figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant
knew of the falsity of the defamatory meaning at issue."05 This standard

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 837.
Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 311.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 837; Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 322.
Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 323.
Id. at 244.
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gives slightly more protection to media defendants5 6 than the Franklin and
Bussel test, which does not provide a legal "out" for those defendants who
were aware of a defamatory meaning but who intended to convey an
innocent meaning.
Given the similarities, however, between the state of mind standards
proposed by Franklin and Bussel and Dienes and Levine on the issue of
defamatory meaning, and because each at minimum requires an awareness
of defamatory meaning on the part of the defendant before liability may be
imposed, the standards are referred to collectively in this article as the
"awareness of meaning" standard.
B. JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF THE AWARENESS OF MEANING STANDARD

1. Lower Court Decisions
A number of lower courts have adopted the awareness of meaning
standard or called for the imposition of a similar standard. For instance, in
Newton v. National Broadcasting Co.,57 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit addressed the relevance of imposing a state of mind
requirement in the libel by impression scenario.
In that case, entertainer Wayne Newton filed an action for defamation
alleging that three NBC news television stories "conveyed the false
impression" that Newton had help from the Mafia and "mob sources" in
purchasing the Aladdin Hotel in Las Vegas and that Newton, "while under
oath, deceived Nevada state gaming authorities about his relationship with
the Mafia. ' 8 At trial, the district court instructed the jury to consider
59
whether NBC "should have foreseen" the impression alleged by Newton.
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that this instruction is "an
objective negligence test. ' 6° It stated that such an objective standard
conflicts with the actual malice test created in Sullivan that "is deliberately

56. In their law journal article, Dienes and Levine address only the protection that
media defendants should receive in libel cases. Id. at 240-41. They state that "[b]ecause the
institutional press is regularly subject to defamation claims, this Article focuses on the
relationship of the law of defamation to the news media." Id. at 240 n.19. They emphasize,
however, that they are not arguing that the press should receive greater First Amendment
protection "than nonmedia defendants." Id. at 241 n.19.
57. 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990).
58. Newton, 930 F.2d at 667.
59. Id. at 680.

60. Id.
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subjective.",61 The court of appeals stated that an objective standard
"would permit liability to be imposed not only for what was not said but
also for what was not intended to be said. ' 62 It concluded that an objective
negligence standard like the one used by the district court "can never give
rise to liability in a public figure defamation case. "63
The court of appeals never articulated that specific test that the district
court should have applied because it considered the issue of meaning as part
of the actual malice analysis. However, it is clear that the court of appeals
advocated a subjective standard focusing on what was intended to be
said. 64 As the court of appeals stated, the trial court "erred because it
substituted its own view as to the supposed impression left by the broadcast
for that of the journalists who prepared the broadcast."6 The appellate
court thus suggests that if the journalists who prepared the messages in
question were not aware of the impression, no liability should be imposed
on them.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted an
awareness of meaning standard in Saenz v. Playboy Enterprises,Inc.66 In
that case the plaintiff alleged that a Playboy magazine article falsely accused
him of "complicity in the torture of political dissidents while serving as an
official for the United States Office of Public Safety ("OPS") in Uruguay
and Panama during the sixties and seventies."67 The court of appeals noted
that "some basis, perhaps even a reasonable one, exists for Saenz's claim
that the Playboy article implied his personal involvement in political torture
while an official with OPS. ' 68 However, the article never expressly stated
this fact.
The court of appeals held that in such cases of libel by impression,
courts should employ a subjective state of mind requirement on the question
of meaning. This standard focuses on whether the speaker intended or knew
of the impression that he or she was creating. 69 As the court of appeals in
Saenz stated:
If a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendants acted with actual knowledge of or in reckless

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 680.
See id. at 680-81.
Id. at 681.
841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
Saenz, 841 F.2d at 1311.
Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1318.
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disregard for the falsity of their accusations, it follows that where
the plaintiff is claiming defamation by innuendo, he also must
show with clear and convincing evidence that the defendants
intended or knew of the implication that the plaintiff is attempting
to draw from the allegedly defamatory material.70
The knowledge of implication requirement imposed by the court of appeals
in Saenz echoes the awareness of meaning requirement proposed by Franklin
and Bussel.
More recently, in the celebrated libel case of Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc. ,71 Federal District Court Judge Eugene F. Lynch imposed
different variations of the awareness of meaning standard in each of the
case's two jury trials. 72 In that case, plaintiff Jeffrey Masson contended
that defendant Janet Malcolm falsely portrayed him as egotistical and vain
in a two-part article in the New Yorker.73 Specifically, he alleged that she
conveyed this impression by deliberately altering Masson's statements and
then attributing the quotations directly to him. 7 4 After working its way up
and down the federal court system over the course of a decade, the case
eventually went to a jury trial in May, 1993. Presiding over the first trial,
Judge Lynch gave the jurors, among other instructions, the following
admonition: "The third element that Mr. Masson must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, is that the defendant was aware at the time of
publication of the false, defamatory meaning reasonably communicated by
75
one or more of the challenged quotations.
In addition, when answering the questions on the Special Verdict Form
used by the jury to render its decision, Judge Lynch instructed the jurors to
answer the following question: "Did Mr. Masson prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that Janet Malcolm was aware, at the time of publication,
that the quotation(s) ... defamed him?"7

70. Id.

71. 832 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1993).

72. The first trial in Masson ended when the jurors deadlocked on the issue of the

amount of damages to award the plaintiff. Id. In the second trial, the jury ruled in favor of
Janet Malcolm, the only remaining defendant. Id. At the time of the drafting of this article,

the case was on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

73. See Janet Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship, Trouble in the Archives (pts. 1 & 2),
Dec. 5, 1983, at 59, Dec. 12, 1983, at 60.

NEW YORKER,

74. 501 U.S. 496, 499 (1991).
75. Jury Instructions at 22, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350

(N.D. Cal. 1993) (No. C-84-7548 EFL).

76. Special Verdict Form at 4, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp.

1350 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (No. C-84-7548 EFL).
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In supporting this jury instruction, Judge Lynch ultimately reasoned that
"awareness of defamatory meaning is an element of constitutional law. 77
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Lynch cited to the work of Franklin and
Bussel.7 ' He also found such a requirement in the Ninth Circuit's holding
in Newton v. National Broadcasting Co.,79 as well as in the holdings of the
Seventh Circuit in Woods v. Evansville Press Co., and Saenz v. Playboy
Enterprises,Inc.8 Citing to Newton, Judge Lynch concluded that the court
of appeals' decision in that case stood for the proposition that the Ninth
Circuit has "held that subjective awareness of defamatory meaning must be82
established in order to impose liability under the First Amendment."
Judge Lynch reasoned that the "purpose of the awareness element is to
ensure that liability is not imposed upon a defendant who acted without
fault. 83a He stated that application of this standard is not limited to the
libel by impression or libel by implication scenarios, noting that the
awareness element must be applied "regardless of whether the defendant's
statement is directly or indirectly libelous.""
Upon retrial, Judge Lynch again instructed the jurors to consider the
defendant's state of mind about defamatory meaning. However, he altered
the earlier instruction that had asked jurors in the first trial to consider
whether "the defendant was aware at the time of publication of the false,
defamatory meaning reasonably communicated by one or more of the
challenged quotations." '5 At the second trial, the jury received the
following revised instruction:
The fourth element that Mr. Masson must prove, this one by a
preponderance of the evidence, is that the defendant was aware at
the time of publication of the false, defamatory meaning reasonably communicated by one or more of the challenged quotations,
or published with reckless disregard as to the false, defamatory
meaning reasonably communicated by one or more of the
challenged quotations.8 6

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Masson, 832 F. Supp. at 1362.
Id. at 1361.
930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990).
791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986).
841 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
Masson, 832 F. Supp. at 1363.

83. Id.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 1361.
86. Jury Instruction at 23, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (No. C-84-7548 EFL).
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In addition, on the Special Verdict Form in the second trial, the jury
was asked the following question: "[D]id Janet Malcolm either know that the
quotation defamed Jeffrey Masson, or act with reckless disregard of whether
the quotation defamed him?""7
The instructions and Special Verdict Form reveal that Judge Lynch
added a "reckless disregard" prong to his prior instruction on defamatory
meaning, apparently borrowing this language from the actual malice
standard. It also should be noted that the Special Verdict Form in the
second trial substitutes the word "know" for the word "aware." The use of
the word "know" echoes the first prong of the actual malice standard that
asks jurors to consider whether the defendant knew of a statement's truth or
falsity.
In summary, a number of lower federal courts have begun to adopt
variations of the awareness of meaning standard originally proposed by
Franklin and Bussel, adding another layer of constitutional defense to
defendants in libel actions. It is a state of mind requirement very similar to
the actual malice standard, except that the proposed standard applies to the
element of defamatory meaning, not truth or falsity.
2. Supreme Court Decisions
While a number of lower courts have advocated or employed an
awareness or knowledge requirement on the question of a message's
defamatory meaning, the Supreme Court has never expressly held that such
a requirement is mandated by First Amendment interests of free speech and
a free press. It has, however, suggested in dicta that some minimum
standard of liability on the issue meaning may be required under the First
Amendment when the defamatory meaning of a statement is not clear on its
face.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court held that private
individuals need not prove actual malice to recover damages for actual
injuries caused by a defamatory statement. 89 The Court held that states
could set their own standards for liability in such cases, provided they did
not impose strict liability on defendants. The Court reasoned that allowing
states to impose a standard of liability less than actual malice "recognizes
the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private

87. Special Verdict Form at 6, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
1350 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (No. C-84-7548 EFL).
88. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
89. Id. at 347.
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individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and
broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability." 90
The Court, however, went on to suggest in dicta that a different
standardmight apply when the defamatory meaning of a statement is not
readily apparent to its publisher. It stated:
Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different from
those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil
liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a
reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory
potential.... Such a case is not now before us, and we intimate
no view at to its proper resolution.91
University of Texas Law Professor David A. Anderson remarks that
this caveat "leaves little doubt that a showing of fault with respect to
veracity might not suffice where the statement is not defamatory on its face,
but it is not clear what the Constitution does require. 9 2 The Court's own
language--whether the content would "warn a reasonably prudent editor or
broadcaster"--suggests the imposition of an objective negligence standard
(rather than the subjective awareness of meaning standard) that focuses on
whether the defendant used reasonable care in investigating potential
defamatory implications that might be drawn from a message.
In summary, there is a growing movement among legal scholars and
lower federal courts to add a second subjective state of mind fault element
to the rubric of constitutional libel law. The Supreme Court has suggested
in dicta that a fault standard on the element of meaning may be required in
some cases, although it has never squarely addressed the issue.
II. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON THE AWARENESS
OF MEANING STANDARD

University of Chicago Law School Professor Richard A. Epstein states
that the law of defamation "necessarily involves at least three parties--the
plaintiff, the defendant, and a third party--who interact in a wide array of
94
circumstances." 93 This relationship represents a "defamation triangle."
The roles played by the third party--the message audience--in the defamation
90. Id. at 348.

91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 463
(1975).
93. Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan, Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 782, 785 (1986).
94. Id.
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triangle are critical in three related areas. The third party plays a pivotal
role in: (1) processing message meaning; (2) creating, maintaining, and
transforming individual reputations; and (3) representing the location of the
primary injury element in defamation--reputational harm.
This article argues that the awareness of meaning standard denigrates
and emasculates the roles of the third party. It suggests that adoption of the
standard, when coupled with use of the actual malice rule, transforms libel
into a two-party tort. The third party--the party that traditionally plays an
active role in meaning determination, in creating and transforming
reputations, and that is the site of reputational harm--is the odd party out.
Adoption of the standard conflicts with the common law's conception of
defamation as a relational tort that serves plaintiffs as an avenue of redress
for reputational injury.
Sections A and B reveal that the awareness of meaning standard
conflicts with the active role that readers play in determining meaning and,
in so doing, contradicts the nature of defamation as a relational tort and the
concept of reputation. Section C argues that the process for determining
truth and falsity in libel law is distinctly different from the process of
determining meaning. This difference is important because it suggests that
while truth and falsity may be suitable for the application of a subjective
state of mind requirement like actual malice, the element of meaning is not
tailored for a subjective state of mind standard like the awareness of
meaning rule. In a nutshell, meaning, unlike the element of truth/falsity, is
not suitable for a subjective state of mind requirement.
A. THE STANDARD IGNORES THE REALITIES OF THE MEANING PROCESS

Subsection 1 provides a brief background on communication research
that acknowledges the active role that readers necessarily play in the process
of determining meaning. Subsection 2 then notes that the common law
standards for determining meaning are in accord with communication
research that focuses on the active role that readers play in the meaning
process. Subsection 3 demonstrates how the awareness of meaning standard
conflicts with the realities of meaning determination and identifies the
concomitant problems with such a standard that attempts isolate aspects of
a dynamic communication process.
1. Readers Play Active Roles in Determining Meaning
Writing in a 1986 Dickinson Law Review article considering the links
between communication research and defamation, libel scholars Randall P.
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Bezanson and Kathryn Ingle emphasize the critical role that readers play in
determining meaning. 95 They state that "audiences play active parts in
message and meaning construction. '"96 Citing to research and theory in
semiotics and hermeneutics, they observe that the "notion of the active
reader pervades communications-related scholarship." 97 For instance,
communication scholar John Fiske argues that "meanings are not located in
the text itself. Reading is not akin to using a can opener to reveal the
meaning in the message. Meanings are produced in the interactions between
text and audience. Meaning production is a dynamic act in which both
elements contribute equally." 98
Fiske's observations make clear that the meaning intended by the
encoder or source of a message--a potential defendant in a libel action--does
not necessarily dictate or control meaning. The reader plays an active and
crucial role in the determination of message meaning. Furthermore, Fiske's
description of a "dynamic" process of meaning suggests that it is futile to
isolate one element of the meaning process--such as the source's intent, the
text, or the audience--and believe that it controls meaning. In brief,
meaning is a complex process involving negotiating between reader and
text.99
Likewise, communication scholar Mary Anne Moffitt notes that
"American interpretivism privileges the audience's active role in deriving
personal, privileged meanings from a text."'" Meaning is l°seen as "audience-centered" in the American tradition of interpretivism."
The so-called "effects tradition"1 2 of empirical American communication research also acknowledges the active role that audiences play in
For instance, communication
determining the impact of messages.
researchers Jeremy Cohen and Albert Gunther identify a number of
audience-centered variables relevant to libel law that may influence the
impact of messages on a person's reputation. 3
In brief, scholars of communication in both the cultural studies and
effects camps do not view the audience or message recipient as passive.
95. See Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36.
96. Id. at 587.
97. Id. at 588.

JOHN FISKE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES 164 (1990).
99. Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 607.
100. Mary Anne Moffitt, Articulating Meaning: Reconceptions of the Meaning Process,
Fantasy/Reality, and Identity in Leisure Activities, COMM. THEORY, Aug. 1993, at 231, 236.
101. Id. at 231.
102. JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE 89 (1988).
103. Jeremy Cohen & Albert C. Gunther, Libel as Communication Phenomena, COMM.
& LAW, Oct. 1987, at 9, 28.

98.
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Audiences necessarily play an active role in interpreting message meaning.
The determination of meaning occurs as part of a communication process
that involves active participation by message recipients. Meaning is not
something controlled or totally controllable by the message communicator.
Any "search for meaning" necessarily involves how people other than the
message source perceive and process the communication.
2. The Recognition and Accommodation of Active Reading in the
Common Law
The common law's emphasis on the reader and message recipient on
the question of defamatory meaning acknowledges the active role that
readers play in the meaning process.'
At common law, the issue of
meaning focused solely on how the average reader, giving words their
natural and ordinary effect, would understand a message. 5 As Dienes
and Levine state, "[a]t common law, the focus in establishing defamatory
meaning was on what a reader could reasonablyunderstand the publication
to mean."''
This maxim recognizes the interaction between text and
reader.
Bezanson and Ingle, drawing the link between communication
scholarship on meaning and libel law, state:
It is by now commonplace within media theory that audiences,
whether readers or listeners, play active roles in even the least
interactive media. The audience has also been an important
element in common law defamation, because it is the audience, or
interpretive community, which is the site of reputational harm.'0 7
At first glance, the meaning process described in Subsection 1 above
seems to suggest that all meaning is relative, a condition that could paralyze
a legal system that depends on precedent and fixed guidelines. The
common law of libel, however, recognizes this danger and imposes
limitations on the process of meaning determination, reining in otherwise
unbridled audience discretion and relativism.
At common law, words are to be given their plain and natural meaning,
with jurors not allowed to give a strained or unreasonable construction. 0 8

104.
"has been
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 828 (stating that defamation historically
a recipient-centered concept").
See MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.2d 536, 547 (1959).
Dienes & Levine, supra note 4, at 247 (emphasis added).
Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 600.
SACK & BARON, supra note 18, at 77.
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An average or reasonable reader standard is commonly applied on the
question of meaning.' 9 For instance, in both trials in Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc. jurors were instructed that the language in question
"must be taken in its plain and ordinary sense" and that the meaning of
words involves consideration of "their natural and probable effect on the
mind of the average reader."" In addition, the language must be considered as a whole. As Robert D. Sack and Sandra S. Baron state in their
treatise on libel law, "particular words must be read in the context of the
entire communication as a whole.""'
The common law of libel thus recognizes the dynamic interaction
between reader and text on the element of meaning, but maintains guidelines
and standards to keep meaning determination from becoming a linguistic
free-for-all.
3. The Awareness of Meaning Standard and the Privatization of Meaning
In contrast to the common law, the awareness of meaning standard
conflicts with communication research and theory on meaning. The
standard attempts to isolate and segregate the speaker's intent from other
crucial aspects of the communication process in which meaning is negotiated. By privileging the source's intentions, the standard ignores the roles
that audience, text, and culture play in the dynamic processes of meaning
determination.
According to Bezanson and Ingle, there is a grave danger in separating
the elements of the communication process and focusing on the source's

109. Id. at 81. A crucial distinction must be recognized here between questions of
meaning and questions of value. Franklin & Bussel, supra note 3, at 829-30 n.14. The
question of meaning--which is the focus of the awareness of meaning standard--involves
determination of "whether the words will bear the 'spin' that [the] plaintiff is seeking to put
on them." MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS
MEDIA LAW 200 (5th ed. 1995). In contrast, the value question, which is necessarily
considered after resolution of the meaning question, focuses on whether the particular
meaning in question is the type that could harm a person's reputation. Id. at 201. It is only
on the value question that disputes arise about in whose eyes reputational harm should be
measured--so-called "right-thinking" people or, in the words of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 559 (1977), a "substantial and respectable minority" of the community. A
discussion of this issue and the value question is beyond the scope of this article, which
focuses instead on a proposed standard that relates only to the meaning question.
110. Jury Instruction at 13, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (No. C-84-7548 EFL); Jury Instructions at 12, Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1994) (No. C-84-7548 EFL).
111. SACK & BARON, supra note 18, at 76.
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intent to the exclusion of the content of the message, the audience's
interaction with that content, and public discussion and debate about that
message and its potential meanings. "2 They emphasize that "any attempt
to make sense of human communication which obscures the dynamic
communication process in favor of precise analysis of isolated parts of that
process will likely lead to distorted conclusions.""..3
The awareness of meaning standard indeed distorts the very notion of
meaning. It privileges the intent in the head of the message source, not the
meaning actually conveyed to reasonable readers. By pleading ignorance of
a meaning that a jury finds a message is susceptible of conveying and that
the plaintiff alleges is conveyed, a libel defendant gains a potential escape
hatch from liability. If the jury believes a defendant's protestations of lack
of awareness of meaning, he or she is cleared of liability. This defeats the
common law purpose of defamation law--providing redress for reputational
harm.
This standard--one that privatizes meaning in favor of defendants and
ignores realities of communication processes--threatens to jeopardize the
common law's goal of compensation for reputational harm. The focus is
taken off the question of harm and injury and placed instead on considerations of fault and a message source's intentions. The actual malice
standard already provides a fault standard to protect defendants that often
becomes the focus on libel litigation. As Bezanson and Ingle state:
If the defamation torts are to sustain their purpose in providing
redress for reputational harm rather than for slipshod journalism
or media irresponsibility, the analytical frameworks that are now
applied in the interest of free expression must be carefully
assessed. Privileges and standards of proof designed to allow for
more precise determinations of fault and falsity tend to isolate
some variables in the communication experience and to ignore
others. When these isolated and specific issues are addressed and synthesized in the form of a libel judgment, 4they often fail to
explain the communication taken as a whole."
The awareness of meaning standard fits this description. It is a fault
standard that isolates a single variable in the communication experience
while it ignores others. In particular, it excludes the audience's role that is
vital in determining a message's meaning. In addition, it excludes the role
of the text (the message), privileging instead the thoughts and intentions in

112. Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 607-08.
113. Id. at 589.
114. Id. at 591.
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a defendant's head. The problems with the standard, however, extend
beyond its direct contradiction of the reality of the meaning process and its
frustration of the common law purpose of defamation law.
B. THE STANDARD CONFLICTS WITH THE RELATIONAL NATURE OF
DEFAMATION AND REPUTATIONAL HARM

As noted above, the law of defamation involves at least three parties-the defendant (the message source), the plaintiff (the individual referred to
in the message), and the message audience (the third party to whom the
115
defendant's message about the plaintiff is communicated and received).
The role of the third party is vital not only in receiving and interpreting
messages, as described above in Section A, but also in shaping and
transforming individual reputations and as the site of reputational harm, the
central injury element in libel law." 6 This section argues that the proposed standard ignores the relational nature of the tort and substantially
derogates the role of the third party.
1. Linking Meaning, Reputation, and the Role of the Third Party
Meaning and reputation are inextricably linked. A reputation is a
relational interest, manifested in the attitudes, opinions, and overt actions
and behaviors of others toward the plaintiff within a relevant community." 7 How people come to think, feel, and behave toward an individual
is influenced both by how they process information that they receive--how
they interpret and understand messages about the individual--and by their
discussion with others about that information. As Bezanson and Ingle state,
"reputation entails the evaluative interpretation of information concerning an
'
individual or entity by a relevant discourse community. 18
Simply put it is the audience's active interpretation of messages and
processing of information that creates, maintains, and transforms an
115. See Epstein, supra note 93, at 795.
116. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) (stating that "damage
to reputation is ...the essence of libel").
117. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH INAN OPEN SOCIETY 118 (1992) (defining
reputation as a relational interest "existing outside the individual persona, an intangible
'asset' of social or professional life that may be inventoried like any other stock-in-trade");
Lee C. Bollinger, The End of New York Times v. Sullivan: Reflections on Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 28 (providing that reputation is often equated with
one's "standing within a community").
118. Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 585-86.
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individual's reputation. The speaker's intent behind a message does not
control another individual's reputation. As Bezanson and Ingle state,
"[rieputations are established not because of a speaker's motive or the
specific content of a media message, but because these and other elements
of the communication process have been interpreted and assimilated by
those for whom that motive or message has salience."'1 9 Reputations thus
evolve as part of a dynamic communication process involving active
interpretation of messages by readers and/or viewers.
The communication processes involved in shaping individual reputations also extend beyond the realm of individual processing of information
and message meaning. These additional processes involve discourse and
debate among individuals within a relevant community. Specifically, readers
may discuss the meaning of information that they receive about an
individual and reformulate their own conceptions about how the information
impacts a person's reputation. It is in this public process of discussion that
an individual's reputation is molded and transformed. These communication
processes help to make the concept of individual reputation, in the words of
University of California-Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law Professor
Robert C. Post, an inherently "social and public" phenomenon. 2 °
2. The Links Between Reputational Harm and the Role of Third Parties
Reputational injury occurs when there is harm to one's relationships
with others caused by a defamatory message. As First Amendment scholar
Rodney Smolla states, "[d]efamation is defined in terms of injury to one's
esteem or standing in the community--the very vocabulary with which we
describe the tort conjures up notions of interference with business, family
or social relationships."'' Smolla's description makes clear the nature of
the relational interest that is an individual's reputation.
The source of injury to reputation in libel law is a defamatory message.
In determining whether a potentially injurious defamatory meaning is
conveyed, it is necessary for at least one person other than the plaintiff and
defendant to receive the message and understand it in a defamatory sense
alleged by the plaintiff before proceeding in a libel action.' 22 In resolving
119. Id. at 586.
120. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 708 (1986).
121. See SMOLLA, supra note 117, at 118.
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 cmt. c (1977) (providing that "Itihe
question to be determined is whether the communication is reasonably understood in a
defamatory sense by the recipient").
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the issue of message meaning, "[I]anguage is to be given its natural, plain,
ordinary, obvious meaning." '
As noted above, a reasonable reader
commonly is employed on the question of message meaning.'
The role of the reader/viewer of a message--the third party in libel law-thus lies at the heart of reputational harm. Only if the reader or viewer
understands the defamatory meaning alleged by the plaintiff to cause harm
may a plaintiff proceed with a libel action. 2 5 Furthermore, when readers'
understanding of the defamatory message causes them to change their
behavior or opinion of the plaintiff in the negative direction, actual injury
to reputation occurs. The reader is thus not only vital for interpreting
message meaning, but also represents the location of reputational harm. As
Bezanson and Ingle state, "it is the audience, or interpretive community,
which is the site of reputational harm."' 26
In summary, the third party plays a crucial role not only in interpreting
meaning and shaping reputations, but also in the processes that lie at the
heart of reputational harm. Unfortunately, as Subsection 3 below suggests,
the awareness of meaning standard conflicts with these facts.
3. Awareness of Meaning Standard: Ignoring the Relational Nature of
the Tort and Depreciating the Role of the Third Party
A major flaw with the awareness of meaning standard is that it ignores
the relational nature of defamation. It emasculates the role of the third party
as the interpreter of messages, the creator of reputations, and the location of
reputational harm. It allows a defendant to escape liability even though a
reasonable reader might understand that the message in question to convey
the defamatory meaning alleged by the plaintiff. Furthermore, the standard
allows the defendant to escape liability even though actual injury to
reputation may have been caused by his or her message.
While message recipients play a vital role in shaping and molding
individual reputations through processing of messages and debate and
discourse, this role is largely stripped away by the awareness of meaning
standard. The thoughts and intentions in the head of a defendant about
meaning are allowed to trump the actual processes that occur in shaping,
123. SACK & BARON, supra note 18, at 77.
124. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
125. This, of course, is not to say that the plaintiff will win the libel action simply
because at least one person other than himself and the defendant receives the message and
understands its defamatory meaning. Other elemetlts, such as fault on the question of truth
and falsity, must be satisfied to win a libel action.
126. Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 600.

NORTHERN ILINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

transforming--and harming--individual reputations. This radically changes
the nature of defamation as conceived at common law, removing the role of
the audience.
The standard comports with what Bezanson and Ingle characterize as
libel law's "increasing disregard for the relational aspects of defamation."' 27 The ramification of this, Bezanson and Ingle state is clear--"the
concept of defamation as a tort which protects relational interests within
relative interpretive communities loses force when those communities, or
audiences, are not recognized as active interpreters."'1 28 The awareness of
meaning standard does much more than give defendants another defense in
libel actions--it changes the very nature of the defamation tort and the
"delicate balance"'' 29 between defendant, plaintiff, and message recipient.
The balance shifts distinctly in favor of the defendant, with the message
recipient largely removed from the equation.
C. MEANING, UNLIKE TRUTH/FALSITY, IS NOT SUITED FOR A SUBJECTIVE
STATE OF MIND REQUIREMENT

This Section argues that meaning and truth/falsity--two distinct
elements in libel law--are determined in readily different fashions. The
law's conception of truth/falsity as objective, verifiable fact makes it much
better suited for a subjective state of mind standard, such as actual malice,
than the element meaning. Concomitantly, this suggests that the awareness
of meaning standard--as a subjective state of mind standard applied to the
issue of meaning--may be inappropriate.
1. Truth/Falsity as Discoverable, Objective, Verifiable Reality
Unlike the process for determining message meaning described above
in Section A, the method for determining truth and falsity in libel law does
not require or entail an active role on the part of the message recipient (or
Epstein's "third party"). Instead, the journalist or other message communicator may embark on a solitary search for determining truth or falsity and
discover it independently of any communication process. The law engages
in the fiction that truth, unlike meaning, exists independently of the reader
or audience for a message.

127. Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 603.
128. Id. at 603-04.
129. See Epstein, supra note 93, at 786.
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As Harvard professor Frederick Schauer states, the law of libel assumes
"that certain objective factual truths exist, that some state of affairs does
obtain."'0 Truth is thus a discoverable, objective reality that exists
independently of the journalist or defendant. It can be investigated and
discovered by a message source, independent of any effort by third parties.
Indeed, the watch dog role of the press assumes that it will ferret out the
truth about government conduct and operations and report it to the public.' 3'
The message source thus has the ability, in most cases, to control the
truth or falsity of his or her messages. In some cases, however, ascertaining
the truth may be difficult. This difficulty in large part underlies the
Supreme Court's adoption of the actual malice standard. As Justice Byron
White stated in his concurring
opinion in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
32
Assn., Inc. v. Bresler:1
The New York Times case was an effort to effectuate the policies
of the First Amendment by recognizing the difficulties of ascertaining the truth of allegations about a public official whom the
newspaper is investigating with an eye to publication. Absent
protection for the nonreckless publication of "facts" that subsequently prove to be false, the danger33 is that legitimate news and
communication will be suppressed.1
The difficulty in determining truth or falsity thus does not stem from
the complex dynamics of human communication processes. Rather, its
sources are the impediments that may block the investigatory process, such
as faded memories of witnesses, shield laws, and lost or destroyed evidence.
Indeed, there may be a dispute about what the truth really is in a particular
case, with the jury left to decide what is true by weighing the evidence and
its credibility. The actual malice standard provides a method of protection
for defendants when such obstacles arise on the quest for true facts.
Because truth is conceptualized as objective and verifiable fact beyond
the dynamic processes of human communication, it is much better suited for
a subjective state of mind requirement like actual malice than the issue of
meaning. Unlike meaning, there is a fixed benchmark or referent of truth
against which a defendant's subjective state of mind may be compared.

130. Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in
Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 267 (1978).
131. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 297 (articulating a central role for the press as a watch dog over

government abuses and corruption in First Amendment jurisprudence).
132. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
133. Id. at 22-23 (White, J., concurring).
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2. Message Truth/Falsity as a Question of Accuracy
The question whether a particular printed statement is true or false
really amounts to a question of accuracy. Complete truth, as Sack and
Baron note, is not necessary to establish the defense of truth, as "minor
inaccuracies do not render an otherwise truthful article actionable."'" All
that is required for the common law defense of truth is that the statement
sued upon be found to be substantially true. As the Supreme Court stated
in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,135 the law of libel "overlooks
minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth." 136 The
concept of accuracy thus lies at the heart of the legal issue over whether an
allegedly defamatory statement is true or false for purposes of libel law,
with minor inaccuracies held not actionable.
Truth and falsity of a message then boils down to "a content-oriented
question.' ' 37 The question is whether the content published in an article
or book is accurate--whether it matches or corresponds with a reality that
exists independent of the writer or publisher. As attorney Martin F. Hansen
states, the law assumes "that factual statements describe a reality existing
apart from the individual observer."'138 Hansen adds that there is a
"presumed stability between statements and the reality they purport to
describe."' 39 A correspondence theory of truth is thus employed in libel
law in which the question is whether printed statement X corresponds with
an independent reality Y.
For instance, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States
Supreme Court held that some of the statements at issue were false because
they "were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery."' 4 The Court in Sullivan compared the printed statements in the
advertisement in question 4against the "events which occurred in Montgomery" to determine falsity.' '
This conception of falsity invokes the related concept of verifiability,
with the determination of factual falsity at libel law turning on the ability
of the parties to verify a statement's truth or falsity by reference to outside
134. SACK & BARON, supra note 18, at 185.
135. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
136. Id. at 516.
137. See Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 586.
138. Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly
Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 43, 55 (1993).
139. Id. at 57.
140. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 258 (1964).
141. Id.
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and falsity determinaevidence.' 4 2 As Sack and Baron suggest, the' truth
43
fact."
'historical
for
"search
a
to
tion amounts
This approach to truth and falsity is evident in the Supreme Court's
decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.144 In that case, the Supreme
Court articulated the standard for when statements are legally considered as
either actionable fact or non-actionable opinion. In articulating the standard,
the Court held that only statements that are objectively verifiable--statements
14 5
that are, in the words of the Court, "provable as false" --are actionable
statements of fact.
The Court then illustrated that determinations of factual falsity. are
made by comparing whether a published statement, X, matches an objective
fact, Y, that exists independently of the publisher of statement X. In
Milkovich, a central issue was whether the plaintiff lied while testifying
before the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA). If the plaintiff
had not lied, then the statement in the column at issue that accused him of
lying would be considered false. The Court stated that "a determination
whether [plaintiff] lied in this instance can be made on a core of objective
evidence by comparing, inter alia, [plaintiff s] testimony before the OHSAA
board with his subsequent testimony before the trial court."" The Court
emphasized that whether Milkovich had lied was "an articulation of an
objectively verifiable event."'47 Upon determining whether the plaintiff
had lied, this fact then could be compared to what was printed in the
column at issue in Milkovich.
This is a referential theory of truth. It is one in which the law checks
for a one-to-one correspondence between what was printed or written in an
article and what transpired in the real world (a referent). If the two match,
or a least are not substantially different, then for purposes of libel law the
publication is true.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc. 48 also illustrates the Court's one-to-one referential (or
correspondence) theory of truth and falsity. In that case, the Supreme Court
held, in the context of the deliberate alterations of quotations, that an
alteration from what was actually said by a quotation's source does not

142. See Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, Consensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly
Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 43, 48 (1993).
143. SACK & BARON, supra note 18, at 193.
144. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
145. Id. at 19.
146. Id. at 21.
147. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
148. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
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make the published, altered-version of the quotation false unless there is "a
material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement."'' 49 The Court
then compared what plaintiff Jeffrey Masson said on a series of taperecorded interviews with what writer-defendant Janet Malcolm attributed to
him."50 Essentially, the Court asked whether statement X published by
Malcolm and attributed directly to the mouth of Masson matched statement
Y made by Masson on tape-recorded interviews, employing the material
change in meaning test as its barometer of accuracy.
In summary, truth--at least for purposes of libel law--exists independently of any human communication process. It is objective and discoverable. Truth is stable; it is not--unlike meaning--negotiated by the reader.
The reader or audience of an article or other message plays no role in
shaping or creating the truth because it exists a priori of the article or
message in question.
D. THE ELEMENT OF TRUTH/FALSITY IS SUITED FOR A SUBJECTIVE STATE OF
MIND STANDARD WHILE MEANING IS NOT

Because truth is assumed to be fixed, it is well suited for the application of a subjective state of mind requirement like actual malice. There is
an objective reality against which a defendant's knowledge and state of
mind about the veracity of a particular fact may be compared. In other
words, a defendant's state of mind (X) may be compared with an objective,
independent reality (Y).
In contrast, the meaning subscribed to an article or message necessarily
depends upon information processing and active participation by readers, as
well as discussion and discourse among members of a community about its
contents. Meaning, unlike truth, "is not stable or unchanging, but varies
with its context and an audience's understanding of the purpose for which
the statement was made."''
The ramification of this fact about meaning
is that there is not an objective, independent reality against which to

149. Id. at 517.
150. It should be noted that Malcolm claimed that some of the quotations that appeared
in her article about Masson but were not found on the tapes were contained on hand-written
notes of her conversations with Masson. Id. at 508. In yet another twist in this seemingly
never-ending case that is currently on appeal again, Malcolm claimed in August, 1995--more
than a decade after the case began--to have discovered missing notes that she claims contain
three of the quotations at issue in the case. Karyn Hunt, Writer FindsMissing Notes to Libel
Case, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 26, 1995.
151. Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly
Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 43, 72 (1993).

19951

AWARENESS OF MEANING IN UBEL LAW

compare a defendant's state of mind about meaning. There is no benchmark
against which the defendant's alleged state of mind about meaning may be
evaluated. The element of meaning, in contrast to the element of
truth/falsity, is thus ill suited for the application of a subjective state of mind
requirement.
CONCLUSION

This article suggests three reasons why judges, justices, and legislative
bodies should proceed with caution before adopting the awareness of
meaning standard. First, the standard conflicts with basic communication
research and theory about message meaning. It fact, it corrupts the concept
of meaning. It fails to acknowledge the crucial interaction between reader
and text, and instead overemphasizes the thoughts in the mind of the
message source. The intentions of the speaker, however, are not the same
thing as the meaning of a message.
Second, by ignoring the role of the reader or third party in defamation
law, the standard comports with what Bezanson and Ingle characterizes as
libel law's "increasing disregard for the relational aspects of defama'
It not only conflicts with the realities of communication, but also
tion."152
with the nature and purpose of the tort. As Bezanson and Ingle state, "the
concept of defamation as a tort which protects relational interests within
relative interpretive communities loses force when those communities, or
audiences, are not recognized as active interpreters.' 5' The natural role
of the third party is removed from the balance in defamation. Defendants
are allowed to escape liability for reputational harm even though reasonable
readers may understand a message to convey a defamatory meaning.
Finally, the article reveals that the meaning and truth/falsity are distinct
concepts, with the element of truth/falsity better suited for a subjective state
of mind standard. Meaning, as the common law acknowledges, is
negotiated and unstable, while truth is assumed to be objective, verifiable,
and independent of any communication process. That libel law engages in
the fiction that truth is objective makes it much better suited for a subjective
state of mind requirement than meaning. The independent reality of truth
conceptualized in libel law provides a firm benchmark against which a
defendant's subjective state of mind may be compared. This standard for
comparison is lacking on the issue of meaning.

152. Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 36, at 603.
153. Id. at 603-04.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

As noted early in the article, this interdisciplinary analysis and its
conclusions are not intended to replace or substitute for the First Amendment policy concerns of free speech and legal reasoning that militate in
favor of its adoption. Rather, the analysis is intended to supplement the
forceful policy-driven arguments offered by Franklin and Bussel, Dienes and
Levine, and lower court judges, and to help ground the law of defamation
in the realities of communication processes. A complete analysis of the
awareness of meaning standard should be cognizant of both the legal
arguments in favor of the standard as well as communication research which
suggests that it may be a flawed approach to resolving the legal problems
it is intended to address.
What is clear is that what appears at first to be the simple addition of
one element to the calculus of constitutional libel law has consequences
much greater than enhancing speech protection. It distorts the nature and
purpose of defamation law in the name of free speech. Whether distortion
of the tort in the name of protecting speech and a free press is sound
ultimately must be put to debate in the legal community.

